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Professor James Bradley Thayer, of Harvard, has for a long time been.
doing an excellent work toward making the law of evidence more logical
and consistent and to bring it upon a rational basis. One of his contentions
has been, and is, that the presumption that a man is sane in the absence of
evidence to the contrary is a general maxim of legal reasoning, and that it
has no particular relation to the law of evidence. Thayer Cas. Ev. 335. And
he has inveighed strongly against considering presumptuous "instruments
of proof" "of probative force," etc. In a recent Connecticut case, Appeal of
Sturdevant, 42 At. 70, the court charged in part as follows: "But the law,
gentlemen, presumes every person to be of sound mind until the contrary
is shown; and this presumption makes for the proponents of the will and
is of probative force in their favor, and must be considered by you along
with the evidence offered by the proponents. This presumption must be
cast into the scale with the evidence." The will was found duly executed,
etc., and the contestants appealed. One of their grounds of appeal was that
the charge was incorrect. They cited Prof. Thayer's works and argued
along the lines which Prof. Thayer takes. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the court below. The opinion, by Baldwin, J., said: "A meta-
physician addressing an academy of metaphysicians in terms of precision
might properly tell them that the evidence for the proponents was the ex-
istence of the testator at the date of the will, and that in balancing this fact
against the evidence of incapacity offered by the contestants some weight
should be given to the presumption which the law prima facie makes that
every man's mind is sound. Such an instruction, however, would only con-
fuse an ordinary jury. It is of no service to them when called upon to pass
on the question of testamentary capacity to have their attention directed
to the fact, which nobody disputes, that the man was alive when he signed
the will, or to be told that this is to be considered as evidence from which
the law draws a certain inference. Any allusion to this intermediate step
in proof can be safely omitted on the presumption of security brought di-
rectly before them, without raising subtle distinctions as to its proper source.
The important thing for the jury to understand in the case at bar was that
the proponents had something to rely on besides the positive evidence they
had introduced-that this was to be considered together with the evidence,
and that it consisted in a presumption recognized in law as based on the
general facts of life, which has probative force enough to turn the scale, if
otherwise the balance should seem to them to stand equal. The charge as
given sufficiently answered this demand." This implied criticism on Prof.
Thayer's theory of presumptions, coming from one who has been thirty
years in the active administration of justice, who knovis thoroughly the
nature of the jury which, Prof. Thayer insists, has had so much effect on the
law of evidence, should have much weight. Many who have read Prof.
Thayer's Treatise of Evidence at the Common Law will be inclined to doubt
the practical value of all the refinements he attempts. Now, as ever, there
are practical difficulties which seem insuperable in the way of making the
law of evidence administered by the courts academically and logically per-
fect.
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The rule in regard to assessments by municipalities to recover from the
abutters the part of the cost of improvements, etc., announced by the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Norwood v. Baker, 1g Sup. Ct.
187, is that such assessments must be limited to benefits ascertained to
accrue to the property owner. On principle it would seem as though the
assessment should be subject to a further limitation that it must not exceed
the cost of the improvement itself; this for the reason that there is no con-
tract relation between the municipality and the property owner. .He is
forced to have his property benefitted and to pay the cost of the benefit so
far as is peculiar to him, i. e., the city can recover from the property owners
as much as they are benefitted, because the work is a public one and justifies'
a use of the taxing power. But it would seem, on principle, that they could
not recover more and in this way make money out of the property owner
by selling him improvements against his will. This line of reasoning seems
to be the true ground of decision in the series of cases which hold that an
assessment to meet the cost of a contract which includes in its provisions
an agreement to keep in repair for a series of years is void. Boyd v. Mil.
waukee, 66 N. W. 6o3 (Wis., i896); where the repairs are by the charter
made a charge on the city, Fehler v. Gosnell, 35 S. W. 1125 (Ky.); where
statute allows assessment only for construction, City of Kansas City v. Han-
son, 55 Pac. 513 (Kan.); where, apparently, the common law is considered
to place repairs on the city. In this case there is also an intimation that the
contract is void for want of power. This point was decided in People, etc., v.
Maher, etc., 56 Hum. 81, where the contract was held void because repairs
could not be assessed on the property owners. This seems an attempt to
attack the contract where the assessment could not be attacked, and the
court thought it inequitable. If the provision referred to is intended to be
a warranty of proper construction, it is unfortunately phrased and should be
changed. See Fehlerv. Gosnell, 35 S. W. 1125, II28. In the cases of Parsons
v. Dist. of Co., 170 U. S. 45, Leominster v. Conant. 139 Mass. 384, it is
held that an assessment is not invalid because it will bring in more than
enough to pay the original cost of an improvement, because the excess is to
form a fund for repairs and not to go into the general fund of the city. But
probably this would not be so if in the District of Columbia or in Leominster
repairs could not be charged on the abutters.
